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NOTES AND COMMENTS

AVOIDING ADVERSE RECEIPT OF PATENTABLE MATERIAL

A progressive manufacturing corporation today requires a patent
"backbone" which will enable it to stand strong in the tempest of everincreasing competition. Man's ingenious contrivances, represented by
patents or by patentable subject matter,' provide the substantive elements
on which such a corporation may be formed and maintained. Many corporations, for this purpose, rely on a research staff composed of their own
creative engineers and the like; others fitfully try to rely solely on material
submitted by outsiders. Both types, however, may be exposed, voluntarily
or inadvertently, to a knowledge of the outsider's inventions and thereby
incur a potential for subsequent strife. The corporation so exposed, conscious of the unsolved need, may have already spent a considerable sum
of its own money to develop an invention. It would feel that it should
be free to utilize its own discoveries without having to compensate the
outsider, notwithstanding an approximate duplication of effort and result
on his part. Moreover, the corporation would probably not be willing to
pay for the invention without seeing the material, and the inventor may
not want to disclose his material without some guarantee of compensation.
This situation creates an impasse which would probably not be settled
without a struggle in lieu of an appropriate mediator.
It becomes readily apparent, then, that a potential financial hazard
lies before every manufacturing corporation when it merely opens its
mail.2 For it might, by doing so, expose itself to the pitfalls resulting
from the confidential disclosure of such questionable patent material. The
patent material as referred to herein, is merely a highly concrete form
of a trade secret. On this basis, the plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(1) that the disclosure was novel; (2) that the disclosure was made in
confidence; and (3) that the feature disclosed has been used by the
defendant. 3 How, then, may the corporation proceed in order to protect
itself against the adversities that may flow from the receipt of confidential
patent disclosures, whether sought by it or thrust upon it by the outsider?
One possible approach to this question would be for a corporation to
introvert itself and try to refuse to consider all patent material submitted
by an outside inventor. A small number of corporations believe that this
1 "Patentable material" or "patent material" as used in this comment refers to
ideas of a broad or general patentable nature.
2 "The Greek Gifts in the Day's Mail", Business Week (McGraw-Hill Publishing
Co., Albany, N. Y.) Nov. 16, 1957, p. 187.
3 De Filippis v. Chrysler Corp., 53 F. Supp. 977, 61 USPQ 25 (1944) ; Schreyer
v. Casco Products Corp., 97 F. Supp. 159, 88 USPQ 515 (1951) ; Mitchell Novelty
Co. v. United Mfg. Co., 199 F. (2d) 462, 95 USPQ 120 (1952); Boop v. Ford
Motor Co., 177 F. Supp. 522, 122 USPQ 570 (1959).
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approach will prevent any adverse contact with outsiders and is therefore
the best way to defend against the consequences of disclosures from such
persons. This is an inane belief resulting from a rather naive approach
to the business world. Even the smallest and most backward corporation
must have outside activity and this alone is enough to result in at least
an occasional inadvertent exposure to unsolicited patent material and
possible liability for payment therefor. However, this approach will provide a high margin of safety by absolutely preventing the outsider from
establishing an express contract. It will also tend to prevent the establishment of an outsider's proof, which he needs, in order to get relief
under an alternative of an implied or quasi-contract, by avoiding thought4
less adverse admissions by the corporation.
However, even a corporation which is introverted to this extent must
still open its mail. By so doing, it may be forever damned under the
implied-in-fact or quasi-contract theories notwithstanding the fact that it
may have independently developed the same or similar contrivance. 5 This
is especially true under circumstances of a jury trial where there is great
sympathy for the individual. The impressionable lay jury may have the
tendency to look upon a corporation as a cornucopia to be shared by all
and as an undeserving bully having an overpowering bargaining position.
With these factors in mind, the introverted corporation, which feels
that it is incapable of properly handling such outside patent material and
seeks refuge by refusing to consider any such material under any circumstances, should be ready to demonstrate that it has not unduly exposed
itself to patent material which is inadvertently received. If there is any
remote indication that it has shown the material to its developmental or
other associated personnel, it may become liable for breach of confidential
relationship if a similar feature is subsequently utilized. This is exemplified by Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co.6 An engineer of the defendant
Corporation had merely seen the plaintiff's designs for a new car which
the defendant returned to the plaintiff. Subsequently, a new car was
designed and built by the defendant's company with the help of the
engineer avowedly without the aid of the plaintiff's plans. The court
said that "there must have been an 'unconscious assimilation', and although final plans deviated from the plaintiff's in more or less substantial
4 Trenton Industries v. A. E. Peterson Mfg. Co., 165 F. Supp. 523, 119 USPQ 41
(1958).
5 Hoeltke v. C. M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F. (2d) 912, 28 USPQ 176 (1936) ; International Industries, Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907, 91 USPQ
198 (1951); Ackermans v. General Motors Corp., 202 F. (2d) 642, 96 USPQ
281 (1953).
656 F. (2d) 962. 13 USPQ 12 (1932).
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particulars, the salient features of the plaintiff's were included; to the
extent that the plaintiff's plans, communicated in confidence to defendant
Company, did enter into final designs, the defendant did inequitably
appropriate those plans and should account to the plaintiff."
Even the introverted corporation may very well be doomed to the
pitfalls of confidential disclosures if it retains the unsolicited materials.
It can refuse to open suspected mail and can immediately return all
questionable disclosures to the sender and unconditionally refuse to consider them.7 At best, this procedure is highly dangerous inasmuch as it
destroys the corporation's record of what was actually disclosed. This
could cause a great hardship to the corporation if the inventor is able to
provide records which might otherwise be contradictory, and if the corporation's independent development of the inventor's scope of disclosure
is an issue in subsequent litigation.
The introverted policy may prevent thoughtless or inadvertent admissions, but this policy also discourages the submission of ideas. Obviously,
such a policy may hamper the corporation's relations with the public, but
may stop the submission of unsolicited future patentable ideas. However,
this results in ignorance on the part of the corporation with a resulting
market disadvantage as compared to corporations which are prepared to
handle such disclosures to their betterment.
By absolutely refusing to accept patentable material, the corporation
creates situations which prevent "fishing expeditions" by outside inventors
who are seeking information about a corporation's progress in a certain
field. Otherwise, an adventurous corporation, which accepts patentable
material and informs the inventor of the merits of his material in regard
to the desires and needs of the corporation, commits a two-fold error.
The acceptance of material may subject the corporation to possible liability
for breach of confidential relationship and unjust enrichment.8 Further,
the corporation's reply may well supply such inventor with information
which will enable him to anticipate the goals of the corporation's developmental staff. The latter situation would be disastrous to the corporation's
financial and employee incentive. The corporation might thereby be maintaining a developmental staff which does nothing more than lay the
groundwork for an outside inventor who will want compensation. Corporations would thereby collectively inundate the entire industry with
7 See 65 Harv. L. Rev. 673 (1952), for a survey of the specific types of risks
involved In confidential disclosures.
8 Hoeltke v. C. M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F. (2d) 912, 28 USPQ 176 (1936);

De Filipis v. Chrysler Corp., 53 F. Supp. 977, 61 USPQ 25 (1944) ; Ackermans V.
General Motors Corp., 202 F. (2d) 642, 96 USPQ 281 (1953); Smith v. Dravo
Corp., 203 P. (2d) 369, 97 USPQ 98 (1953).
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an outside inventor's inventions which have the latest and most desirable
advances in the specific art. The pseudo inventor can claim a reward
with very little or no actual developmental effort on his part.
The introverted corporation policy will tend to prevent the corporation from contributing to the inventor's "fishing expeditions" and incidentally prevent thoughtless and inadvertent admissions. However, it will
not provide the awareness and know-how to prevent certain specific indirect exposures; namely, exposures occurring during mergers or contract
negotiations and of purchasing or licensing agreements, which normally
befall even the most inactive and backward corporations. 9
If a corporation recognizes the value of properly receiving patent
material and chooses to do so, it should proceed under carefully controlled
conditions. One such condition should be to encourage general disclosures
only. These disclosures should merely indicate the broad classification of
the invention. The personnel chosen to receive such a disclosure can
thereby reduce the exposure to totally undesirable materials by politely
turning down an opportunity for further investigation of undesirable
fields. Of course, this personnel should have current knowledge of the
general applicable areas in which the corporation is interested and to
which they are willing to further expose themselves. The corporation
cannot force the inventor to submit only general disclosures, although
the corporation could develop a favorable precedent in this regard by
constantly pursuing this method of receiving patent material from the
public.
As an additional attempt at safeguarding the corporation, the receiver should require that the inventor sign a waiver or release wherein
he submits his invention on condition that the amount of payment therefor
will be left to the discretion of the corporation. Prima facie, it would
appear that such a release would relieve a corporation of practically all
liability in view of the fact that the inventor is in no way forced to sign
such a release. However, the equity court will not allow the waiver to
be a license for the corporation to steal and will infer unjust enrichment
and breach of trust or otherwise apply the quasi-contract theory to
decide the case regardless of what the conditions were of the waiver or
other agreement. 10
The benefits to be derived from a release are questionable. It may
relieve the defendant from liability." On the other hand, there may be
9 Smith v. Dravo Corp., 208 F. (2d) 398, 97 USPQ 98 (1953); Hyde Corp. v.
Huffines, 303 S. W. (2d) 865, 117 USPQ 44 (Tex. Civ. App., 1957).
10 Blair Engineering Co. v. Page Steel & Wire Co., 288 F. 662 (1923).
11 Davis v. General Foods Corp., 21 F. Supp. 445 (1937).
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a quasi-contract situation notwithstanding a release by the plaintiff as
indicated above. A recent case where the plaintiff had signed a release
was not decided on the basis of the release but instead the court ignored
12
this argument and chose to decide the case on the basis of novelty.
Thus, no corporation should rely on a release as an absolute means of
protection. It appears that even though such a release or other agreement
is signed by an inventor, who is thoroughly aware of what he is doing,
he is nonetheless not necessarily bound thereby to the expense and
frustration of a corporation. Thus, any negotiations with the inventor
can cause trouble for the defendant unless the defendant has clear records
to repudiate confidential disclosure which would otherwise result in a
quasi-contract if not an implied-in-fact contract. A waiver could constitute such record by clearly identifying the subject matter in question
by establishing the date of submission and defining the conditions of
submission."3
A corporation should inform the outside inventor that he should
obtain patent protection before he attempts to negotiate, and he should
be informed that his material is being kept out of the hands of pertinent
personnel until such time as he is able to rely on his patent rights. This
indicates that the corporation is negotiating, if at all, for that which the
outsider can clearly establish ownership of and not merely an idea which
is of questionable ownership. The reasoning back of this is that the law
will not imply a promise on the part of any person against his express
will. 14 The protection here would be much stronger than that derived
from a waiver. However, it is important that both the waiver and an
issued patent be relied on to predetermine the status of the parties.
The best answer to the question of how to prevent the adversities
otherwise resulting from receiving confidential patent material, is to
meet the situation squarely with a specially trained organization which
can anticipate and avoid the pitfalls which would otherwise envelop the
corporation. The liability attendant disclosure of patent material is a
foe that proper organization and know-how can deal with to the advantage
of the inventor as well as the corporation. There must be a special
"breed" of personnel provided who are aware of the corporation's technical needs and business activities while remaining acutely aware and
specially equipped to cope with the legal adversities which may arise.
If a non-technical staff is utilized by the corporation to receive
questionable patent material disclosures, there will be a natural barrier
Boop v. Ford Motor Co., 177 F. Supp. 522, 122 USPQ 570 (1959).
Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F. (2d) 345 (1934).
14 Id.
12
13
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between the disclosure and the developmental and management staff.
This barrier will provide a measurable amount of protection against
"unconscious assimilation. "15 Further, the non-technical staff would no
doubt lack the appropriate authority for making a binding agreement.
This situation would tend to defeat the possibility of an express contract
which might otherwise result from thoughtless statements made by persons
receiving disclosures. 6 However, it should be realized that a non-technical
staff could readily receive material which is subsequently used by a
corporation with the resulting inference leading to an implied-in-law
contract.' 7 A non-technical staff would be advantageous to some degree
in maintaining a record of disclosures which might be important in
establishing a corporation's position in regard to scope and nature of a
specific disclosure to relieve or prevent subsequent disagreement or litigation.
It is important that the non-technical personnel be isolated from the
intricacies of the independent developments of the corporation which
could lead to "unconscious assimilation.' 18 With this in mind, an obvious
disadvantage of such a staff manifests itself; namely, because of the lack
of knowledge of the developments, there can be no statement given to
the outsider which would indicate to him that the corporation has already
developed the idea independently. Such a bit of knowledge expressed in
a friendly manner to the inventor, might otherwise preclude a suit by
the inventor against the corporation before it gained momentum. It is
hardly necessary to mention that this would be the least expensive way
to handle such a situation. The cost of vindication can be high.
A non-technical staff is usually not informed about management 's
activities in regard to negotiations dealing with licenses, mergers, contracts, etc. Patent material is usually an element which forms a main
portion of such transactions and therefore should be handled with extreme
accuracy and legal caution with a full record of what was disclosed and
on what basis it was disclosed. 19 However, an advantage in using a nontechnical staff for receiving confidential disclosures is that they are inherently ignorant of the intricate problems to be solved and are therefore
not in a position to make thoughtless, good-faith, technical comments
15 Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co. of America, 56 F. (2d) 962, 13 USPQ 12
(1932).
16Mitchell Novelty Co. v. United Mfg. Co., 199 F. (2d) 462, 95 USPQ 120
(1952).
17Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 158 F. (2d) 631, 71 USPQ 311
(1946).
IsSee note 15, ante.
19 Smith v. Dravo Corp., 208 F. (2d) 388, 97 USPQ 98 (1953).
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which would result in contributing to a "fishing expedition" by the
outside inventor. This likewise though, illustrates the inability of such
a staff to be able to recognize, analyze, and utilize needed valuable
disclosures.
The most undesirable type of personnel for handling confidential
disclosures of patent material is the technically informed developmental
or engineering staff. 20 Obviously, a disclosure thereto through the mail
or otherwise would be a direct contact with the heart of the corporation
creative personnel and it would be easy for a court to find sufficient
exposure to make the defendant liable. A technical staff is highly concerned with the development and is thereby vulnerable to discussion which
would directly contribute to the outsider's fishing for information. Also,
a technical personnel has its experimentation and development as its
horizon and is not equipped or otherwise prone to keeping exacting records
of the scope and dates of the disclosures. Instead, it will be more interested in the technical working aspects of the patent material and probably
anxious for a chance to be exposed to all innovations appearing in its
realm of activity. This is exactly the attitude that the corporation should
prevent except under controlled conditions. The technical staff should be
separated from direct exposure to unsolicited patent material by an
organization which can prevent untamed exposure to patent material.
The technical staff does not take part in phases of proposed license
agreements or other corporate negotiations where a disclosure is likely
to be made. Thus, the corporation would be exposed to material without
control. Even if the technical personnel was a part of the corporation's
management, it would not be properly informed or otherwise capable of
legally advising the corporation to guide it from the grip of an implied
or quasi-contract in regard to patent material.
Inasmuch as confidential disclosures of patent material may result
in adverse legal consequences, it follows that a corporation's legal staff
should handle such disclosures. More particularly, the disclosures should
be handled by the patent arm of the legal staff inasmuch as it is especially
equipped to cope with this type of situation. The general legal staff will
no doubt be aware of the broad possibility of adversity from receiving
patent material, but it is not trained to interpret the specific legal problems
or the technical structural scope of patents or patent material.
A legal staff of registered patent attorneys is inherently equipped to
squarely meet the problem of confidential disclosure so that the inventor
and corporation may both justly benefit. A patent staff would constitute
20

See note 15, ante.
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a barrier between the outside inventor and the corporation's developmental staff to prevent any direct exposure of the corporation to unsolicited patent material. The patent attorney should withhold disclosures
from the corporation's engineers and other developmental personnel until
the inventor and the corporation can come to terms. The attorney should
immediately inform the inventor of this situation so that the inventor will
reconcile himself with the idea that the corporation's liability will depend
on negotiations and not upon mere disclosure. Every effort should be
made to prevent exposure of the corporation's creative or management
staff to the disclosure. The inventor should be convinced that this is true.
Under this procedure the corporation will remain essentially unexposed
and, in the event negotiations with the inventor fail, the heart of the
corporation is not contaminated with the disclosure.
A patent legal staff is less likely to make thoughtless admissions which
would contribute to an inventor's knowledge of the subject matter and
thus restrain any "fishing expeditions."
The patent attorney would
refrain from making statements resulting in a contract although he may
be vested with the power to contract. Also, he would be present at
negotiations of merger, purchase or license agreements and could thereby
exert his aid in preventing unnecessary exposure to patent material
except on a controlled basis.
A patent staff is morally bound to see that exacting records are kept
of conceptions made during the corporation's developments, both as to
content and date. 21 If the corporation has developed an idea independently and prior to the disclosure from the outsider, the patent department
would be in a position to know immediately and could politely inform
the outside inventor without making unnecessary admissions. Inasmuch
as the patent attorney has a technical background, by necessity, he is in
a better position to inform the inventor in terms of his art without having
excessive legal overtones that might alienate the inventor.
In summary, it is suggested that corporations face the possibilities
of confidential disclosures as being inevitable and prepare themselves to
deal with them rather than trying to avoid them. In so doing, the corporation should adopt an attitude whereby it resigns itself to deal fairly
with outside inventors, but to rigorously apply procedures most likely to
prevent adverse disclosure of patent material. The largest measure of
protection is gained by having a patent legal staff to act as a mediator
between the outside inventor and the corporation. Although the patent
attorneys utilized thereby will be in the employ of the corporation, they
21 Field, "Notebook Entries as Evidence of Priority Dates", 36 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
123 (1959), 35 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 239.
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nevertheless can operate with a higher degree of independence than any
other staff might be able to do. Under these suggested circumstances,
there would be a barrier between the outside inventor and the heart of
the corporation. This barrier would prevent adverse confidential disclosure in a manner least apt to alienate the outside inventor with procedures having legal overtones, but which is still capable of conditionally
receiving patent material disclosures and which is inherently equipped
to maintain records and advise the corporation. Inasmuch as a patent
legal staff will be patent material conscious, alert to technical aspects of
inventions, and legally alert to disclosure adversity, it can serve both the
corporation and the outside inventor in a manner most advantageous to
both.
E. D. ROBERTS

